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IdeaLs and ReaLities of Motherhood: 
A TheoLogicaL Perspective 
Recently I heard a telling story of the lie mothers find themselves living. 
Faced with an important meeting and no child care, a friend of mine took 
her young child with her. Strategically armed with a bag of M&Ms, she 
placed the child on the floor at her knee. After several minutes of surrepti­
tiously dishing out candies under the table, she raised her hands only to dis­
cover that, in her words, "They lied! M&Ms do melt in your hands." The 
milk chocolate mess was not the only lie she encountered in that moment. 
Current myths suggest a mother ought to be able to have a life alongside 
motherhood. Yet combining children and adult work seldom happens with­
out some minor or major fiasco. 
At the beginning of this century Sigmund Freud argued that the uncon­
scious mind refuses to acknowledge human mortality; on one level, people 
truly do not believe that they will some day die. Similarly, with mothering, 
no one really wants to admit that there are no easy answers. Indeed, some 
of the most powerfu1lies have been told about mothering, whether the lie 
of the happy stay-at-home mother of the 1950S or the lie about the ease of 
breast-feeding while returning to paid work of the 1990S. Mothers would 
often rather lie, it seems, than openly admit what they endure. More accu­
rately, mothers lie about the pain ofchildbirth or the complexities ofparent­
ing to protect themselves and others or out of fear that we have not lived 
up to the incessant stream of images of the perfect mother. We lie without 
meaning to because the realities of mothering seem impossible to depict 
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within the limits of modern language and the confines of a still incum­
bent patriarchy. 
Religion has had a lot to do with bolstering lies about motherhood. 
However, in the name of religion people have also doggedly pursued truth, 
even within a postmodern context that radically undermines such an enter­
prise. During different historical periods, religion has served to moderate 
and even unveil the lies people tell and put prophetic visions of abundant 
life in their place. More than other areas of cultural reflection, theology has 
attempted to comprehend this lying and truth-seeking dynamic of human 
behavior. Psychology is a close second in its analogous focus on the tension 
between ideals and realities and in its practice of therapeutic intervention. 
Since religion has had a lot to do with both bolstering old lies about 
motherhood and creating new standards, attempts to critique and recon­
struct ideals of motherhood require an understanding of religious theory, 
even for secular publics. Unfortunately, more often than not, religion is 
bracketed, ignored, or misunderstood. In the first section of this essay I ex­
plore this problem in both the secular and liberal religious discussion. Par­
ticipants in current debates over motherhood, I observe, now seem all too 
ready to assert that there are no answers, perhaps more than we realize falling 
under the influence of Freud's reality principle and his advice about stoic 
resignation to death. But debunking lies about the traditional family and 
motherhood, including those inspired by religion, does not resolve dilem­
mas of mothering, I argue, and leaves some difficult questions. People need 
ideals and myths by which to live, even if these often degenerate into un­
truths and fabrications. In the second section, I briefly consider recent work 
in psychoanalytic psychology that provides a way to understand the longing 
for answers. This leads nicely into a discussion of the contributions of reli­
gion to ideals of motherhood as understood primarily through the work of 
feminists in religion. Theology and psychology, especially under the influ­
ence of feminist theory, can help us understand some of the reasons people 
lie and perhaps correct simplistic answers. They also suggest that people are 
sustained by the hope of answers. And theology, attempting to go still fur­
ther, circles around what good answers look like, even if it can no longer 
pretend to define exhaustively their content. 
The nature ofthe contributions of religion to matters ofmothering and 
the need to understand these contributions are at least twofold-historical 
and normative. First, current dilemmas cannot be understood without com­
prehension of the historical impact of religious practices and beliefs. Al­
though public education in the United States has conventionally omitted the 
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study of religion as a result of the separation of church and state, one cannot 
grasp, for example, either the settlement of this country or the development 
of our constitution without some knowledge of religion. Similarly, as I will 
develop below, one cannot grasp ideals of mothering without some knowl­
edge of the effects of religion on their formulation. Second, religious beliefs 
and practices will continue to have complex normative consequences for hu­
man ideals of fulfillment. While many of these ideals are particular to the 
faithful, public arguments for such values as justice, equal rights, responsi­
bility, democracy, and so forth will gain clarity, viability, and endurance 
from the study of religion. Public dismissal of religion as a field of study is 
unfortunate because it leaves an entire spectrum of human behavior and 
history untouched and misunderstood. This is even more troubling when 
rather limited views of "Christian" values, such as those proposed by the 
Christian Coalition, are those most equated with Christianity or even reli­
gion. The media's tendency to portray religion in sound bites is partly re­
sponsible for such misperceptions. In contrast to subjects like geometry and 
sociology, religion is one subject about which many feel free to claim exper­
tise and yet most are strikingly ignorant. Beyond my specific theses about 
myths and realities, sharpening sensitivity to the contributions of religion 
is an additional agenda for this essay. 
I should clarify at this point that while my central subject is mothers I 
do not separate sharply reflection on mothers from reflection on families 
and disagree with some literature on mothers that tends to do so. My desire 
to reconnect the two results from a philosophically influenced nonsepa­
rative or connective definition of the self and reality and a theologically in­
fluenced conviction that motherhood is fundamentaHy social and relational, 
involving women in family constellations, minimally of child and mother 
and, in some shape and form, a male partner (even if only as a source of 
sperm). Adequate mothering can hardly happen without several concentric 
circles of supporting relationships, extending from mother and child out­
ward to the wider social context. 
Oversight of Religion 
Secularization theories and Enlightenment belief in scientific rationaliza­
tion have encouraged widespread ignorance about the influence of religion 
on mothers and families in contemporary American culture. While I am not 
attempting to provide extended evidence of the disregard for religion here, 
I do want to identify a few interesting books as examples of the questions 
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and distortions that arise when religion is simplified and dismissed or simply 
overlooked. My first two examples are books specifically on the myths of 
motherhood and would be the most likely place to expect attention to reli­
gion. I have chosen two other examples of research on the more general sub­
ject of the family primarily because their authors are influential in discus­
sions of mothers, gender, sexuality, and families. Their inattention to 
religion and the consequences of this inattention are typical of much of the 
literature on issues that, as I will attempt to argue, can never be entirely sepa­
rated from religious ideas. 
The cover of a book contesting the myths of motherhood, Representa­
tions ofMotherhood, edited by Donna Bassin, Margaret Honey, and Meryle 
Mahrer Kaplan, is designed to provoke an immediate reaction from the 
reader. It portrays a miniature 1940S mother strapped in an infant swing, 
gazing up at an imposing, cherubic toddler twice her size. In an attempt to 
rescue the "hostage mother from her swing" and return her to her rightful 
proportions, the collection ofessays examines sentimentalized and distorted 
images ofmotherhood in art, film, literature, the social sciences, and history. 
Mothers, it argues, must be viewed as subjects in their own right. 
This is great as far as it goes. But it does not go far enough. Implicit ethi­
cal and quasi-religious questions drive the book: One of its aims is to chal­
lenge the "predominant image of the mother in white Western society ... the 
ever-bountiful, ever-giving, self-sacrificing mother." I However, if the intent 
encompasses disputing the institutionalization of unconditional love, the 
study of religion and theology is sorely missing. 
The authors of Representations ofMotherhood establish that mothering 
is indeed a complex experience. Is this enough? The editors "want a mother 
who is a real person." But what is a real person? What and who defines per­
sonhood, much less motherhood? And if this question cannot be answered, 
from what vantage point does one hope to question cultural notions of the 
mother? Feminists have often seen religion as parochial and patriarchal, and 
often enough this is the case. The omission of religion in Representations of 
Motherhood is also partly related to the editors' identities as psychologists 
who are by discipline less mindful of the import of normative discourse. But 
if feminists hope to move beyond analysis and critique and, as Bassin, 
Honey, and Kaplan themselves desire, to "push forward a vision of the mater­
nal place as generative for women's psychological development as well as for 
cultural and political change," some kind of ethical, religious, theological, 
and philosophical discourse becomes almost inevitable.2 To dismiss religion 
heedlessly is to miss its continued influence and to fail to recognize feminist 
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scholars in religion as important partners in the u.s. debate about mothers 
and families. 
A single-authored volume, The Myths ofMotherhood, is a nice exception 
to the rule. Also a psychologist, Shari 1. Thurer does include religion along­
side the arts, history, and psychology in her attempt to restore the mother 
to her right proportions and reveal the "useless and ephemeral" character 
of many of our cherished ideals of parental excellence. She intends to estab­
lish that "there are no easy answers, no magical solutions, no absolutes" and 
to encourage "decent people ... to mother in their own decent way."3 None­
theless, despite her thorough analysis, two questions surface that also char­
acterize my other examples. First, how might we understand the human 
need for answers, solutions, and absolutes? Second, having exposed cultural 
myths, from where will we get adequate normative ideals and stories to de­
termine and convey the parameters of human decency? 
Shere Hite's survey on female sexuality in the mid-1970S attracted a lot 
of attention. More recently her turn to the family, in The Hite Report on the 
Family: Growing-Up Under Patriarchy, promises to hold similar public in­
terest. In contrast to other critics, I am more troubled by her inaccurate as­
sumptions about religion than her controversial survey methods. On the 
first page she blames the problems of current families on our sad attempts 
to model ourselves after the" 'holy family.' " If this "archetype" is so power­
ful. and I partly agree that religious ideology pervades our thinking more 
than we acknowledge or understand, then one might expect further investi­
gation of "the icons ofJesus, Mary and Joseph." However, beyond criticizing 
fundamentalist views of families and beyond using religious imagery as a 
straw horse, Hite pays religion little further attention. Had Bite considered 
religion more closely, she might have discovered that the processes ofdemoc­
ratization that she admires and certain religious beliefs are not polar oppo­
sites. She portrays them as mutually exclusive because she sees religion only 
as a fundamentalist reactionary force. Ignoring the plurality of religious tra­
ditions in the United States, she claims that the religious tradition of "the 
Church" "has as its basic principle, at its heart, the political will of men to 
dominate women."4 Yet, as I argue below, religious feminists are themselves 
working from within a variety of religious traditions toward new family 
models of equality and justice that Hite herself seeks. The very ideals ofde­
mocracy she applauds are found within selected religious traditions. 
Thoughtlessness about actual religious traditions does not mean that 
Hite refrains from moral and quasi-religious reflection of her own. In her 
projection of new normative ideals of love and family, she exemplifies re­
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markable naivete. She concludes the family is not struggling; it is simply 
changing. Pluralism in family relationships "should be valued and encour­
aged; far from being a sign of the breakdown of society, it is a sign of a new, 
more open and tolerant society springing Up."5 Hite's conclusion is partially 
appropriate and grows out of a justified fear of conservative alliances. But 
it is also precariously unenlightened about, first, the growing trend among 
previously "liberal" social scientists and politicians alike toward document­
ing the negative consequences of family disruption for children,6 and sec­
ond, the complexity and everyday influence of conservative Christian alli­
ances.? Angry, unreflective dismissal of both phenomena as backlash leaves 
Hite unable to counter conservative arguments with any comparable or sub­
stantive contrasting religious and social interpretations. She ignores the po­
tential deleterious effects of family disruptions on children and overlooks 
the possible positive role of liberal religion in family democratization or in 
reinterpreting biblical traditions. 
Definitions of motherhood and family are hotly debated because they 
are not just functional or descriptive. In her history of the family, Stephanie 
Coontz declares that the family is foremost an ideological conception, "an 
idea) a 'socially necessary illusion' " that justifies particular social, economic 
arrangements.8 The family is a battlefield located at the crossroads ofbiology 
and culture, involved in the formation of persons and values. Debate over 
motherhood, and more recently, fatherhood, is often at the center of the 
conflict. In two sequels to her first book on the history of families, The Way 
We Never Were and The Way We Really Are, Coontz herselfchanges hats from 
historian to social prophet under the pressure of the family debate. Myths 
about the duration ofmarriage or the high incidence of teen pregnancy have 
many harmful consequences: They erode solidarity, foster guilt and nostal­
gia, and diminish the confidence ofthose already beleaguered. When "mem­
ories" of traditional family life "never existed or existed in a totally different 
context;' she points out, ideals become rigid and onerous.9 As historical 
prophet, Coontz banishes many cherished illusions about the "Leave It to 
Beaver" ideal and shatters dominant myths about the self·reliance ofAmeri­
can families, the links between feminism and family disruption, and so 
forth. 
Coontz's efforts to debunk family myths are enlightening. But, once 
again, are they sufficient? She is highly critical ofdefinitions that turn to bio­
logical or religious dimensions to give the term family an absolutistic quality 
that keeps people from questioning its social construction and renegotiating 
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its demands. She demonstrates effectively the extent to which the prescrip­
tive role of the term makes its definition both a political and religious ven­
ture, for good and for ill. But she focuses almost solely on the negative conse­
quences of religion and in her latest two books barely mentions religious 
traditions except when they cast a destructive light on a case. In the end she 
fails to comprehend either the power of myths to lure and enrich life or the 
appropriateness of the human appetite for myth making. Her kind of pro­
phetic history provides sobering but limited resources when it comes to con­
structing new ideals and solutions to parental struggles. Ultimately, she 
wants some kinds of myth-"we need to invent new family traditions:' she 
notes. IO But how, beyond discarding romanticized ideals? Can history and 
sociology alone provide sufficient help to today's families? In her eyes, tradi­
tions and communities which endorse religious traditions have little, if any, 
positive or constructive role. But do traditions only "hold families back," as 
one of her chapter titles asserts? 
The oversight of religion, I readily acknowledge, should be partly laid 
at the doorstep ofliberal religion and theology itself. Until recently, feminist 
religion scholars themselves have tended to neglect families and the mother­
as-subject. Other crucial tasks, whether addressing violence or recon­
structing doctrines ofGod, Christ, and human nature, have absorbed a great 
deal of attention. The ground swell of protest over powerful, reverberating 
ideals of the all-giving mother, it is worth noting, has occurred primarily 
outside the study of religion. The increased interest in a variety ofdisciplines 
in mothers as subjects in the 1980s has only slowly appeared in the study 
of religion in the 1990S. Many theologians are mothers and many advocate 
maternal god imagery and language, but few have investigated actual moth­
ering and what is learned about theology from this vantage point. Fortu­
nately, this is changing. And there have been some important, even if ne­
glected, exceptions to this charge in the work of Kathryn Rabuzzi, Margaret 
Hebblethwaite, and a few other individual essays and collections. I I 
Oversight of religion can also be explained by the silence, hesitancy, and 
ambiguity about change within the less conservative, mainline congrega­
tions and those on the religious left. As vexing as the presumptuousness of 
the Christian right that they speak for all Christians on family matters is the 
vacuous discussions of families and parenting among the Christian left. 12 
This leaves secular society and the media to assume that any discussion on 
the family, mothers, fathers, and religion necessarily entails the conservative 
values ofPat Robertson, James Dobson's Focus on the Family, or the Promise 
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Keepers. This is a sad misrepresentation of the richness of religious tradi­
tions for which those in the mainline and on the religious left are also re­
sponsible. 
Attempts to set the agenda for families in Coontz and Hite, and attempts 
to counter myths of mothering in Representations ofMotherhood and Thurer 
raise some tough questions about the ideals and realities ofmothering. What 
do children need, and mothers need in relation to them? To what extent do 
parents have a moral responsibility as adults to recognize that their decisions 
shape the lives of their children for better and for worse and, through them, 
the wider community? To what extent should they alter their actions on 
their children's and society's behalf? And what is the father's role in all this? 
Beyond questions of parental practice are riskier theoretical questions. 
One of the key problems that those who identify themselves as feminist must 
face, as well as those who wish to promote an adequate family theory in gen­
eral, is how to preserve what is good in the institutions of family, marriage, 
and parenthood without preserving patriarchy?13 Axe all forms ofheterosex­
ual monogamy oppressive and, if not, what forms are not and how might 
they be sustained? Can we after all devise alternatives to the patriarchal fam­
ilywhich find an appropriate place for the institutions ofmale-female sexual 
intimacy, commitment, and responsible parenting without merely reinforc­
ing heterosexism, gender stereotypes, and sexist exploitation? Are proposals 
supporting the nontraditional approach of egalitarian parenting possible if 
one also wants to support diversity in family form? 
These kinds of questions can be answered, of course, without recourse 
to religion. But, I believe, more adequate answers wiU evolve if feminist 
scholars in religion participate in the discussion. Practically, answers are 
more likely to have an impact on human behavior if supported by religious 
narratives and practices. Theoretically, if feminists intend to reconstitute 
motherhood as a more complex reality, their task should include an under­
standing of the evolution of ideals. Moreover, feminists, including feminist 
scholars in religion, should continue to define not only the ambiguities of 
good mothering but new constructive ideals and future possibilities. Of 
course, the construction of ideals is a questionable task in a postmodern 
context deeply suspicious of truths of any kind, much less religious truths. 
The Need for Truth and Ideals in a Postmodern Context 
In Escape from Paradise, religion scholar Kathleen Sands outhnes a powerful 
critique of wishful thinking in theology. Escaping paradise, according to 
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Sands, means admitting the tragic dimension of all experience to an extent 
precluded by conventional theology, including feminist theology. In a post­
modern context, we can no longer expect to "encounter truth and goodness 
unaccompanied by the most profound questions of violence, conflict, and 
loss."14 As she remarks, "no single feature has marked the theology of this 
century so deeply as the encounter with the radical evils washed up by the 
receding tide ofmodernity." 15 No ontological truth can define the good since 
social interests construct truth rather than the other way around. 
Mainstream and feminist Christian theology hide the evil, ambiguity, 
and inevitable tragedy ofhuman experience behind one of two kinds of reli­
gious solutions: Christian rationalism and its shadow, Christian dualism. 
Either one hopes monistically that being is good and evil is the privation of 
good, or nonbeing. Simply put, one refuses to acknowledge evil's real exis­
tence and beings are ranked hierarchically according to their degree ofgood­
ness, with women and children below men. Or reality is construed as a battle 
between two relatively equal forces of good and evil in which good eventu­
ally triumphs and evil is blamed on the Other. Lest the nonreligious think 
they have escaped unscathed, the categories cover modern variations. The 
Enlightenment progress-oriented view of evil as "bias"-that is, an accident 
to be remedied by obj1ectivity and universal imperatives-is simply a ver­
sion of Christian rationalism. And certain forms of feminism have dualisti­
cally aligned the 'bad with the "White Male System" and the good with 
"Women's Reality." 16 
Philosophically, Sands has put to rest the dream of truly knowing the 
good and seeking moral perfection. The good, she writes, is an "entirely hu­
man, entirely fragile creation;'I? and therefore theology involves the inter­
rogative mode ofa "tragic heuristic." A tragic heuristic requires asking ques­
tions more than suggesting answers and coming face to face in the stories of 
our lives with irredeemable loss and irresolvable conflict rather than denying 
them. It requires people to relinquish ideals and create what right and wrong 
they can in radically plural contexts. Moral judgments then become "strate­
gic, contextual judgments about how the diverse goods of life might best be 
integrated and unnecessary suffering minimized in a particular place and 
moment."18 
In all this, Sands strikes a responsive chord in the postmodern heart. 
While her analysis is disturbing, it is not unusual or atypical of much of 
postmodern conversation in liberal religion. And in some ways it fits well 
with the arguments against myths ofmotherhood discussed above. The sec­
ular discussion of mothering would find in Sands much confirmation of 
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their suspicion of theological ideals and religious myths. She lends religious 
support to Coontz's decisive conclusion in The Way We Really Are: "The big­
gest lesson of the past is that there are no solutions there." 
On one very important account, however, the approach to ideals that 
Sands' work exemplifies is limited. She offers little in the way of recon­
structed alternative religious traditions and beliefs. While she hopes to illu­
minate ethical discourse and enhance the vitality of religious feminism, her 
contemporary version of a situation ethic is minimalist. One is over­
whelmed with a sense of the inescapable nature of evil in the world and left 
with little account of the motivation to combat it. To return to our central 
subject, how are families and mothers in particular to live between recogni­
tion of the radical nature of evil and the yearning to eradicate its presence? 
BU1lding moral commitments in the ruins of postmodernity involves not 
just intellectual finesse but psychological insight and awareness. If one is to 
practice compassion~the closest Sands comes to resurrecting a religious 
ideal-how does one know compassion when one sees it, much less how to 
exercise it? Neither the recognition of tragedy nor the respect for diversity 
relieves people of the responsibility of making ethical distinctions between 
delightful and destructive actions. In fact, recognition of and guidance for 
the many, many ways to be a good mother and the many ways in which 
mothering goes wrong calls for an even more than usually dogged, sophisti­
cated, complicated pursuit of adequate truths and ideals. 19 
Psychoanalytic Reflections 
The postmodern rejection of ideals in secular feminism and Sands' theology 
is not entirely psychologically tenable. Freud, of course, relegates ideals and 
religious hopes about love and work, including motherhood, to the terrain 
of the superego, the pathological, and the delusional.20 By contrast, psycho­
analytic self-psychologist Heinz Kohut suggests that people need answers by 
which to live, even answers that wax over into lies.21 Whereas Freud saw ide­
als as defenses against drives and sought to penetrate the unconscious by 
overcoming defenses and resistance, Kohut seeks to establish "selfstructure" 
by comprehending defense and resistance and reclaiming the significance of 
ideals. The self yearns for structure for its very survival, and ideals are an 
important element in this process of creating structure. In this view, some 
lies may actually be a necessary defense against self-demise rather than a re­
gressive behavior in need of exposure. 
According to Kohut, human pathology results not from repressed in­
Ideals and Realities of Motherhood [291 
stincts and oppressive superego constructs, but from an insufficiently struc­
tured self or from a defect in the establishment of a coherent self at the pre­
oedipal level. Healthy narcissism is crucial to the development of the coher­
ence of the self. Narcissism, defined in classical psychoanalytic theory as the 
libidinal cathexis or investment in the self, or in nontechnical terms as self­
love, is not something that must be outgrown or replaced by object-love or 
love for others. Rather, Kohut argues, narcissism has its own independent 
line of development, distinct from ego development. 
Kohut distinguishes three primary narcissistic needs: mirroring, or the 
need for admiration; twinship, or the need for those like us; and, most im­
portant for my purposes, idealization. These needs are neither defensive ma­
neuvers to escape aggressive and sexual drive-wishes in psychoanalytic terms 
nor, in religious terms, destructive signs of selfishness or fallacious tyranni­
cal assertions of absolutes. On the contrary, a child begins to develop a cohe­
sive self only as significant others respond empathically to her developing 
narcissistic needs. 
Alongside the need for mirroring and twinship, "a person needs some­
thing general to respect."22 When an infant meets the inevitable shortcom­
ings of parental care, one way she compensates is through the idealization 
of a perfect, admired omnipotent "self-object:' a person who is experienced 
as part of her self, often a parent. The central experience of the child is "You 
are perfect, but I am a part of yoU."23 Over time, with empathy that includes 
in-tune understanding and discipline as much as sympathy and positive re­
gard, and with necessary but not traumatic failures in empathy, the infant 
incorporates the function of the idealized object into the structure of the 
self in transmuted. form. This is not a simple one-time phenomenon. Under 
adequate conditions, dependence on progressively more mature and expan­
sive idealizable self-objects continues throughout life. From this idealization 
comes the capacity for sustained commitment and value-oriented behavior. 
Almost anything can serve as an idealized self-object and psychology 
itself creates such ideals. The idea of the "good enough" mother illustrates 
an attempt in psychoanalysis to name that range of behavior that is less than 
ideal but adequate. Like other ideals, even this benevolent ideal is capable of 
its own degeneration: D. W. Winnicott himself sometimes uses the term to 
describe a mother who is uncannily perfect in her responses.24 Yet both Win­
nicott and Kohut emphasize an intriguing twist: Failure is a requisite dimen­
sion to ideals and to ideal parenting. Failures in parenting, like empathic 
"breaks" in therapy, are actually primary sites for the creation and internal­
ization of healthy self-structure, but only when they are nontraumatic and 
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part of a larger context of understanding and explanation. The dynamic in­
terplay of illusion and disillusionment, seen most clearly in the use of transi­
tional objects, is essential for mature development.25 
In short, people tend to create ideals, even in a postmodern context of 
ambiguity and pluralism, as one means to soothe, comfort, and sustain the 
self and its relationships. People may create ideals that fade into lies to pro­
tect themselves and survive, to retain a semblance of control over life and 
self, or, in more troubling cases of family violence, addictions, racism, and 
class arrogance, to maintain power over others as well as control over them­
selves. While religion and morality still can operate in illusional or delu­
sional ways, they also serve as sources of self and social cohesion. A villain 
in many cases, religious discourse is also, as Martha Nussbaum remarks, "in 
multiple and powerful ways, a major source of hope for women's futures."26 
Many people will worship and deny gods; the important question is what 
kind. 
Religious and Theological Reflections 
on Ideals of Motherhood 
Representations of self-sacrificing motherhood in Western society are not 
just a result of nineteenth-century Victorian values. They are intertwined 
with older historical and religious notions-Christian edicts of suffering 
servanthood, Jewish ideals ofmaternal self-sacrifice, Aristotelian and Chris­
tian codes defining the relationship between subordinate and superior fam­
ily members. and other powerful motifs. Furthermore, ideals of mother­
hood are not only intertwined with religious teachings. They are embedded 
in the formative religious practices of men as elders and priests, in prayers, 
doxologies, and creeds imaging a male deity, in the exclusion ofwomen and 
mothers from leadership in sacred rituals, and in continued resistance to 
change in all of these areas. 
The impact of religion in the United States has not declined nearly as 
much as popular opinion has led people to believe. These practices continue 
to have a hidden yet persuasive influence because they are embodied phys­
ically in word and in deed and repeated weekly in ritualized ceremonies 
of conviction and prodamation in settings that are unique in their cross­
generational participation of children, youth, adults, and the elderly. For 
many people, worship is the primary encounter with particular family and 
gender ideals and, at the very same time, the last place for critical reflection 
on these ideals. Genuine worship requires an immersion in participation 
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that often forbids a more distanced evaluation. So young and old alike ab­
sorb a great deal in ritual practices that remains unnoticed, hidden, unana­
lyzed. 
The impact of religion extends beyond religious beliefs and practices 
internal to faith communities. The influence ofChristianity on the national 
scene is hardly more apparent and yet more overlooked by the general public 
than in marriage and family law. As law and ethics professor John Witte ob­
serves, "Much of what we cal1 the traditional family and the classic law of 
the family was forged by Roman Catholic theologians and canon lawyers in 
the first halfof this mil1ennium, then reforged by Protestant theologians and 
jurists in the middle of this millennium and transmitted with periodic re­
forms into the 20th century."27 The Roman church played a key role in shift­
ing control over marriage from the clan to the couple and in privileging mo­
nogamy over polygamy, divorce, and adultery. Sacramental interpretations 
elevated the status of the bond between woman and man above ties to par­
ent, other family members, government, or parish. As a sacrament, mar­
riage could only be received voluntarily by the consent of the individual. 
Others argue that this Western Christian principle ofconsent "created an as­
sumption that individuals have a right to accept or reject the conditions of 
their lives, an assumption that was very different from that which prevailed 
among cultures committed to clan-control1ed marriages."28 
The need for a proclamation of consent to validate marriage is only one 
example of a church action that sparked more extensive social reform, in­
cluding the gradual weakening of the control of fathers over wives and chil­
dren. As fundamental to the current status of marriage was the Protestant 
Reformers' move to put a social model ofmarriage in place of the sacramen­
tal model, making marriage a public and civic estate and the family a social 
unit as important as church and state. Each of these historical examples sug­
gests a more general observation. Current contractual law can adjudicate the 
specific rights of parties involved in families, marriages, and partnerships, 
but a broader moral vision is necessary to inspire and shape the large range 
of obligations that surround mothers, fathers, children, marriage, family, 
and community. Moreover, if people used religion to construct visions of 
family life, it will take an understanding of religion to undo and redo them. 
Assuming that religion continues to have an impact on lives through 
religious practices and edicts and through its historic influence over social 
and legal arrangements, what does reflection on religion offer specifical1y to 
our discussion of the myths of motherhood and the longing for ideals by 
which to live? I wil1 limit my comments to four topics. First, theologians 
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themselves have long debated the complex relationship between ideals and 
reality. The present and the not-yet quality of grace is a core constituent of 
Christian faith as is the Reformed premise that all human answers are par­
tial. I will merely allude to some of this discussion. Second, radical mutuality 
in parenting, even as helpfully reconceived by feminist theologians, is easier 
said than achieved. The nature of mutuality in nonequal relationships of 
parents and children and other dependencies and transitional hierarchies 
must be more clearly understood by religious and secular feminists alike. 
Third, with discussion ofmutuality in mind, I believe we should reconsider, 
as one illustration of the importance of reinterpreting Christian ideals, a 
major roadblock to genuine mutuality in Christian marriage-the dis­
turbing and much maligned "household codes:' or New Testament passages 
that spell out the rules for relationships within the family. Finally, feminist 
theory has emphasized new understandings of the experience as distinct 
from the patriarchal institutionalization ofmotherhood. Yet the opposition 
between experience and institution has not proven adequate to the complex 
reality of motherhood. In religious circles the family and motherhood are 
still considered crucial social institutions. These institutions must somehow 
come to contain the rich diversities and ambiguities offamilies within struc­
tures that enhance the common good without repudiating the experiences 
of mothers. 
First then, the relation between ideals and reality. In our work together 
on From Culture Wars to Common Ground, Pamela Couture shed light on 
the use and misuse of religious ideals in the U.S. history of marriage and 
families. The purpose of an ideal, she states, "is to point us beyond the im­
mediacy ofour concrete existence toward a vision for which we can hope."29 
However, few people approximate ideals and the way we do depends heavily 
upon the actual circumstances ofour lives. Even the separate gender spheres 
of the Victorian ideal were in actuality less distinct than the ideal and ap­
peared in many variations across the United States. Based on a historical 
study of U.S. families and religion-Puritan ideals of the northeast, Angli­
can and Calvinist patterns of the Southeast, Wesleyan and revivalistic values 
of Western movements as well as the imposition and moderation of these 
ideals among Native ~mericans and African Americans-Couture con­
tends: 
It is important to distinguish between cultural ideals and their concrete 
variants which arise when people shape ideals in tension with their con­
texts. The danger in formulating ideals is that their concrete versions will 
be invested with ultimate status. Sometimes, concrete variations of family 
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life identified with Christianity have been imposed on new situations as if 
they had the status of an ideal, even when, in the new context, the model 
actually violates the ideal of Christian love and justice.... 
The most oppressive form of the use of ideals occurs when norms de­
rived from concrete realities are applied by people in power, as if they were 
ideals, to judge situations in which people cannot possibly attain the ideal 
because their situation is so different. Frequently, this abuse of an ideal oc­
curs across race and class line.30 
Ideals can be destructive when invested with ultimacy and absolutism. This 
does not in itself invalidate the premise of ideals such as justice or love. Ideals 
can also be used constructively and subversively by less powerful groups to 
challenge the status quo. Analogous to their healthy role in psychological 
development, ideals provide a vision by which new cohesive patterns and 
structures emerge and evolve. 
Paula Cooey makes a similar point. "We cannot live without some pat­
tern to social life in order to establish responsibility for child rearing and 
the care of the elderly;' she observes, "but most family patterns, when taken 
as absolute, often wreak havoc on the lives of the people they are supposed 
to protect and nourish."31 Codes have only a provisional nature and must be 
responsive to the particularities of context. Nonetheless, patterns and guides 
are necessary. This is an important step once removed from Sands' tragic 
ethic or Coontz's resignation to a history that ultimately yields no answers. 
The psychoanalytic code of the "good-enough family;' as adapted by those 
in religion, defines an ideal family which "is less than its own ideal and yet 
competent enough to raise reasonably adequate children." Minimally, the 
norms of such a family include nurturing children into healthy adulthood 
and strengthening the personhood ofthe parents. From aChristian perspec­
tive, they include the ideals of hospitality, compassion, justice, and recon­
ciliation.32 
These claims rest in part on a long-standing tension in the history of 
Christian theology between vision and realism. Denominational differences 
as well as the differences between theologians surface around this tension. 
Lutherans, for example, tend to believe that "the finite is capable of receiving 
the infinite," or that ideals can become realities; and the Reformed tend to 
hold that "the finite is not capable of receiving the infinite!" or that humans 
are too limited and fallen to realize ideals.33 A few theologians, like Reinhold 
Niebuhr with his understanding of the ironies of history, for example, or 
his definition of sin as inevitable but not necessary, bring together the two 
traditions in a jointly enriching way.34 
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Let me turn to my second point, the ideal of radical mutuality in par­
enting. In seeing mutuality as a relatively easy human achievement next to 
the impossibility of agapic or sacrificial love, Niebuhr himself grossly over­
simplifies the significance of mutuality in Christian love. Radical mutuality 
is a trans formative Christian ideal with potentially more dramatic conse­
quences for families than sacrificial love. While feminist theologians have 
propounded this ideal in various forms for the last three decades,35 only a 
few have attempted to modify it to fit the distinctiveness of family relation­
ships. Christine Gudorf continues an early feminist theological challenge to 
doctrines ofsin as prideful self-assertion by asserting the importance ofself­
fulfillment in the very act ofgiving to one's children. She recognizes the tran­
sitional sacrifices necessary for adequate mothering but holds mutuality as 
the goal rather than sacrifice. Here she argues for the relevance of Catholic 
ideas of charity that do not exclude the selfover traditions shaped by Protes­
tant views of self-interest as invalidating Christian love (in Luther, Kierke­
gaard) Niebuhr, Anders Nygren) for exampIe).36 The meaning of Jesus' death 
itself assumes a different interpretation under this view. Less a sacrifice and 
more an unavoidable consequence ofthe love ofothers, the cross calls people 
to renewed relations (that may require moments of sacrifice) but not to self­
sacrifice in and of itself. This may sound like a slight distinction but it makes 
all the difference in the world in people's lives and in mothering. And this 
change in understanding is one of the hardest to implement in ritual practice 
and the interpretation of the cross that accompanies the act of the Eucharist 
or communion that stands at the center of most Christian worship. 
Feminist theological discussion of mutuality has sometimes been 
sloppy. First, more often than not) the proclamation of mutuality assumes 
a relationship between two relatively equal adults. However, in the practice 
of parenting as well as many other practices, such as teaching, counseling) 
and so forth, equal relationships are rare. More difficult questions arise when 
one strives to maintain the ideal of mutuality within nonequal relationships. 
Second, with the free and easy use of the term "mutuality" these days) con­
crete pragmatic details ofmaintaining life are often dropped from the equa­
tion. The movement from rhetoric to reality in the practical equality be­
tween women and men and between mothers and fathers has to reckon with 
factors as diverse as the limits of time) the competing values of a capitalis­
tic market economy, the economic disparity between the races) classes) and 
gender) and the demands for geographic mobility.37 Both oversights lead 
to a neglect of the tricky question of how and where certain sacrifices be­
come requisite, either in unequal relationships or in the midst of the practi­
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cal demands of equal relationships, as a means to maintain mutuality and 
equality. 
Nonetheless, Christian feminist theology has effectively established 
radical mutuality as more than a humanitarian interest. Mutuality has onto­
logical or divine warrant in a Trinitarian, relational godhead where God is 
understood as three-persons.in-one and in need of human relationship.38 
In other words, at their core, images of the divine exemplify relationality 
rather than project an omnipotent, all-powerful but basically independent 
supreme being. Mutuality also has biblical warrant in the early Christian 
communities.39 Despite the patriarchal character of the ancient societies in 
which Christianity arose and despite the ways in which the Christian tradi­
tion has perpetuated ideals of male dominance in the centuries since, Elisa­
beth Schussler Fiorenza, for example, claims that in Mark's gospel women 
emerge as the "true Christian ministers and witnesses" and the most coura­
geous of all his disciples.40 Others join her in confirming the prominent role 
of women in early Christianity.41 Still others explain the contradiction be­
tween Paul's insistence on the silence ofwomen in the church in I Cor. 14:34­
35 and the radical inclusivity of his message elsewhere as a concession to the 
prevailing values ofhis time or even as the imposition and addition ofsome­
one else's words. In other words, over against social convention certain kinds 
ofegalitarian premises characterized the early Christian movement. I am not 
arguing, of course, that all mothers must believe and abide by these particu­
lar tenets ofChristian faith to realize good mothering and mutuality. Rather, 
I am simply observing that to the extent that religious ideals shape moth­
ering, then ample grounds exist for alternative ideals within Christianity to 
shape culture and families in new directions. 
In the light ofChristian ideas ofmutuality, the hardest texts to contend 
with and the texts that have most influenced the ideals and institution of the 
family in the Western world are the household codes of the New Testament. 
Household codes is a term applied to scriptural passages that sought to order 
family relationships among early Christian converts in two Deutero-Pauline 
letters (letters attributed to but not authored by Paul) of the Christian New 
Testament, Colossians and Ephesians. Typically, in these letters, family 
members are exhorted t.o certain behaviors in relation to one another, most 
specifically, subordinates (e.g., wives, slaves, children) to their superiors 
(e.g., husbands, masters, fathers). The term sometimes alludes to similar or 
related codes in I Timothy, Titus, and I Peter, although these passages are 
less tightly structured and related to broader guidelines for congregations 
and communities. 
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These texts are particularly problematic for feminist interpretations of 
mutuality in sex, gender, and parenthood. From at least the Reformation, 
if not earlier, to the last century, they have given supernatural sanction to 
patriarchal family roles in which men lead and women follow. More recently, 
the household codes echo in the background of the handbook for the Prom­
ise Keepers' movement. Similarly, points no. 2, 3, and 6 of the "Danvers State­
ment" issued by the Council on Biblical Manhood and Womanhood formed 
in 1989 among the Christian right declare gender roles ordained by God, in­
cluding Adam's headship in marriage, and redemption as consisting in lov­
ing leadership by husbands and willing submission by wives. 
There are sufficient grounds for arguing, however, that the codes were 
not intended to bolster but to reverse ancient heroic models of male author­
ity in familiesY Historians have documented a genderized pattern ofhonor­
shame throughout the Mediterranean world during the period of Roman 
Hellenism as a prominent backdrop for these texts. Male honor and reputa­
tion was gained through winning and through protecting the privacy and 
"shame" of women in their household. Male dishonor or shame occurred 
through losing and intrusion into the private realmY 
Taking the household codes in Ephesians as an example, we see that the 
author borrows and yet transforms the metaphors of the surrounding male 
culture of strength, dominance, and conflict to suggest new virtues of peace, 
humility, patience, and gentleness. The husband is called to the self-giving 
love of Christ and a sort of mutual subjection not found in similar Aristote­
lian codes. The logic of the Aristotelian household codes is changed, if not 
subverted. The code in Ephesians balances compliance with the patriarchal 
social mores of the times with new innovations about male submission and 
reciprocity introduced by the Christian proclamation. The very need for 
household codes in the Deutero-Pauline letters may itself testify to the dis­
ruptive reality of a new family ethic evolving in the early Christian house 
church movement. 44 
Over history, it is this accent on male subordination that has been most 
overlooked. Instead, women, more than men, have heard and absorbed the 
message of sacrifice and submission. Feminists in religion have tended to 
deride the codes as a reversal of the more inclusive message of equality 
within the early Christian community under the social and political pres­
sures of the patriarchal society of that time. The passage in Ephesians itself 
only finally obtains a modified or benevolent patriarchy, failing to articulate 
new roles for women in leadership and charity. Nonetheless, the hierarchical 
patterns of the Greco-Roman world, if not completely challenged, were at 
Ideals and Realities of Motherhood [299 
least mitigated in the household codes as well as in some important aspects 
of the Jesus movement and in some of the practices of the early church. 
FinaHy, let me turn to my fourth observation on the contributions of 
religion to the discussion ofmyths and ideals of motherhood, an insistence 
upon the institutional dimensions of motherhood and families. In 1976, in 
Of Woman Born, Adrienne Rich made a crucial distinction between mother­
hood as experience and motherhood as institution. In Rich's words, the in­
stitution is superimposed on the experience and aims at ensuring that the 
"potential relationship of any woman to her powers of reproduction and to 
children ... remain under male control."45 She had historical and political 
reason to see the institution as evil and the experience as good. The institu­
tion of motherhood under patriarchy thwarts women's freedom, alienates 
them from their bodies, and corrupts fatherhood. It does so through three 
generic precepts: "All women are seen primarily as mothers; all mothers are 
expected to experience motherhood unambivalently and in accordance with 
patriarchal values; and the 'nonmothering' woman is seen as deviant:' Yet, 
as Rich establishes so well, aU mothers feel ambivalent, some women choose 
not to mother, and "a lesbian can be a mother and a mother a lesbian."46 
Through the courage and intensity of her prose, readers encounter the 
mother as a person with needs, desires, and thoughts of her own. To her 
credit and those who have followed, some of the patriarchal dimensions of 
the institution have less hold than they once did. 
The ensuing years have shown, however, that the relationship between 
the institution and the experience of motherhood is more complex than 
Rich assumes in viewing the institution as the problem and women's experi­
ence as the grounds for fighting it. One never has, it seems, raw experience 
unshaped by institutions. Debunking the patriarchal myths ofmotherhood 
is, in the end, only one half of a job well done. As in the story of the melting 
chocolates, new myths and institutions rather quickly replace the old. The 
task is not simply breaking silences, although under a resilient but weakened 
patriarchy this remains crucial. The task also involves distinguishing poor 
institutions and ideals from more adequate ones and creating institutions 
of family, marriage, partnership, and motherhood that secure the good of 
mothers and the good of others. 
The ways in which reproduction has been controlled by men and 
suffered by women is not adequately addressed, as theological ethicist Lisa 
Cahill points out, "by speaking as though sex and birth have no intrinsic 
social dimension at a11."47 From the perspective ofCatholic ethics, the liberal 
emphasis on personal autonomous choice tends to disassociate sex from pa­
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rental fulfillment and social responsibility. While sexual pleasure and inti­
macy between individuals and couples has an importance of its own, valuing 
them should not mean the neglect of the social meanings of the body realized 
through kinship and parenthood. A strength of the Catholic tradition is its 
strong social vision that connects sexual pleasure, intimacy, and parent­
hood. The personal sexual relationship is situated at the center of a series of 
concentric circles that emanate out from the joy of sexual exchange to the 
parental relationship to the family and finally to the family's critical contri­
bution to the common good. In Cahill's words, parenthood is a "specifically 
sexual mode ofsocial participation"; procreation is "the social side ofsexual 
love."48 Family choices are social and moral through and through. 
In contrast to Rich, then, the choice is not between patriarchal institu­
tions and nature or maternal experience but "between oppressive institu­
tions and institutions that are life enhancing." In this regard, as Jewish theo­
logian Judith Plaskow argues, feminist theology offers a viable path beyond 
the dichotomies that arise in feminist liberal and radical theory between re­
jection ofwomen's body experience and exaltation of it.49 Feminist theolo­
gians generally have not found either of these an attractive or sufficient op­
tion. In part this is because they have grappled with complex historical 
images ofwomen, the valuable and ambiguous contributions of social insti­
tutions, and religious traditions in which intricate human relationship is 
mediated through the flesh. 
This holistic or antidualistic understanding offlesh and spirit as insepa­
rable is a particular reading of experience or nature and institution or cul­
ture shared by feminist readings of Jewish and Christian traditions. Mater­
nal experience is neither a mechanical reflex of biology upon which family 
ideals rest nor solely a male or social construction with no biological refer­
ents. Childbirth and even child rearing are to some extent "bio-social" 
events. Roles and duties in parenting and sexuality are social and physical 
arrangements women and men must constantly renegotiate in face of both 
natural circumstance and historical, social contingency. Maternal stereo­
types and perfectionist absolutes signal an onerous breakdown in this pro­
cess with negative consequences for all involved. 
There is much to be learned about the role of biblical and theological 
practices and beliefs in current dilemmas that surround mothers and fami­
lies. Until we wrestle with the religious dreams and ideals deeply rooted in 
specific traditions and institutions that continue to shape North American 
culture and psyches, authentic change in the visions of mothering, sacrifice, 
compassion, and responsibility will remain fortuitous and superficial. Even 
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less appealing ideals may fill the vacuum left by the demise of conventional 
religious and socia institutions. While a reconstructed religion alone and 
Christianity in particular will not give answers to the complex contempo­
rary quandaries about mothering, one can hardly confront representations 
of motherhood in Western culture without confronting those that emerge 
from particular religious world views. Recent reflection among feminists in 
religion suggests that positive insights and visions for mothers and families 
will emerge from reinterpreted religious understandings. 
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